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ABSTRACT
With the popularity of Social Networking Services (SNS),
more and more sensitive information are stored online and
associated with SNS accounts. The obvious value of SNS ac-
counts motivates the usage stealing problem—unauthorized,
stealthy use of SNS accounts on the devices owned/used
by account owners without any technology hacks. For ex-
ample, anxious parents may use their kids’ SNS accounts
to inspect the kids’ social status; husbands/wives may use
their spouses’ SNS accounts to spot possible affairs. Usage
stealing could happen anywhere in any form, and seriously
invades the privacy of account owners. However, there is
no any currently known defense against such usage stealing.
To an SNS operator (e.g., Facebook Inc.), usage stealing is
hard to detect using traditional methods because such at-
tackers come from the same IP addresses/devices, use the
same credentials, and share the same accounts as the owners
do.
In this paper, we propose a novel continuous authentica-
tion approach that analyzes user browsing behavior to de-
tect SNS usage stealing incidents. We use Facebook as a
case study and show that it is possible to detect such inci-
dents by analyzing SNS browsing behavior. Our experiment
results show that our proposal can achieve higher than 80%
detection accuracy within 2 minutes, and higher than 90%
detection accuracy after 7 minutes of observation time.
1. INTRODUCTION
Many people use Social Networking Services (SNS, such
as Facebook) daily, and have associated a lot of personal
and sensitive information with their SNS accounts. These
information generally include friend lists, feeds from their
friends, non-public posts/photos, private interactions with
others (such as chats and messages), purchased apps/items,
etc., and its obvious value makes the SNS accounts one of
the most targeted online resources by hackers to steal. To
protect user privacy, SNS sites today have done a lot to pre-
vent account stealing. For example, Facebook records the
regular IP addresses and devices used by each account. If an
account logs in with an unusual IP address or device, the ac-
count is prompted to either answer some secret questions [1]
or enter a security code sent to the account owner’s mobile
device [2] in order to verify if the login is authentic. Face-
book also allows users to report account stealing manually
if they suspect that their accounts have been stolen.
Despite of all the efforts to prevent account stealing, user
privacy can also be compromised by another form of breach
called usage stealing—unauthorized, stealthy use of SNS ac-
counts on the devices owned/used by account owners with-
out any technology hacks. Usage stealing could happen any-
where in any form. For example, anxious parents may use
their kids’ SNS accounts to inspect the kids’ social status;
husbands/wives may use their spouses’ SNS accounts to spot
possible affairs. Similarly, colleges, supervisors, friends, or
siblings, just to name a few, may also have their own motives
to use acquaintances’ accounts for different reasons.
Usage stealing is common in practice due to the follow-
ing reasons. First, when using their own computers, people
tend to choose “yes” when the browsers ask whether they
would like to save their (SNS) passwords for automatic lo-
gins in the future. This is especially true when users are
using their mobile devices because it is cumbersome to in-
put passwords [22, 15]. Mobile devices also ease the usage
stealing in other aspects, in that they can be physically ac-
cessed by acquaintances or strangers [29], and that most of
them are not locked by PINs [10]. In addition, many SNS
sites use cookies to save the trouble of future account au-
thentications within a short time. For example, once logged
into Facebook, a user need not login again during at most
60 following days [5]. From the above, if someone (mostly
an acquaintance) can access the computer or mobile devices
of an SNS user, it is likely that the person, without the need
of technical background, can peep the information associated
with the SNS account.
However, there is no any currently known defense against
such usage stealing. To an SNS site, usage stealing is hard to
detect using traditional methods because the attackers come
from the same IP addresses/devices, use the same creden-
tials, and share the same accounts as the owners do. More-
over, because users normally do not see the logs, victims can
hardly sense and report the stealthy usage.
Contributions. In this paper, we identify the usage
stealing problem in SNS and propose a novel continuous au-
thentication approach [19, 20] that analyzes users’ browsing
behavior to detect usage stealing incidents. We use Face-
book as a case study, and show that it is possible to detect
such incidents by analyzing their browsing behavior on the
SNS sites, namely, clicks on newsfeeds1, friend lists, profiles,
likes, messages, photos/videos, and comments. Our user
study shows that our proposed scheme can achieve above
80% accuracy with a high confidence within 2 minutes, and
higher than 90% accuracy after 7 minutes of observation
time.
Deployment. Our detection approach is designed to
run on SNS servers and to serve as the first line of defense
against account usage stealing. The deployment is straight-
forward: an SNS server collects the behavior of an account’s
session and feeds it into a detection model in real time. The
model determines whether the user of the session is suspi-
cious, and if so, the SNS server can either 1) trigger more
sophisticated analysis/monitoring, and/or 2) challenge the
session user immediately by secret questions or via a second
channel such as mobile phone authentication [2]. Note that
since we are at the first line of defense, there is no need for an
100% accurate detection model, rather, a reasonable detec-
tion power is sufficient and the key is a prompt and efficient
detection. Also, please note that the proposed methodology
is neither tied to a specific SNS site nor to a certain learning
technique as it is based on the standard supervised learn-
ing framework. For example, while we adopt the smooth
SVM [14] as the detection model in this paper, the service
operators (e.g., Facebook Inc.) may choose the asymmetric
SVM [26] or similar methods if they wish to further reduce
the false positive rates.
Implications. We believe that the usage stealing prob-
lem, while not being well studied so far, will be much more
critical in the future, as people put more and more sensitive
information online. In fact, this problem may not only oc-
cur in the social services, but also online email services such
as Gmail and Outlook.com, time management services such
as Google Calender and Remember The Milk, photo album
services such as Instagram, and much more. Except asking
users to repeatedly authenticate themselves (practically pro-
hibited by usability issues), continuous authentication seems
to be the only feasible solution for attacks of this kind.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review
the related work in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the ra-
tionale behind detecting usage stealing based on browsing
behavior. In Section 4, we describe our user study on Face-
book and analyze the users’ behavior. Section 5 elaborates
our detection methodology. We evaluate the performance of
our scheme in Section 6, and analyze the security issues in
Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing studies on the privacy
issues on SNS and continuous authentication.
SNS Privacy. Privacy is always a concern for SNS users.
Many efforts have been devoted to protect user privacy. He
et al., Zheleva et al., and Tang et al. [11, 21, 30] observe
a privacy hole that attackers can infer private information
(such as sexual orientation) of a user from his/her public
SNS records/activities. Felt et al. and Wishart et al. [7, 24]
prevent privacy leaks from SNS developer APIs and from
1A Facebook newsfeed, which locates at the center column
of one’s home page, is a constantly updated list summarizing
the status of people that one follows on Facebook.
the software based on them. Mahmood et al. [16] focus on
another type of privacy attacks called the frequent account
deactivation. Meanwhile, in the industry, Facebook takes
a vector of measures to protect user privacy. For example,
it provides an official page [4] to educate users about the
correct privacy and security settings, and records the IP ad-
dresses, web browsers, and devices used by each account [6].
If an account logs-in with unknown records, Facebook will
challenge the user either by secret questions [1] or via mo-
bile phone authentication [2]. Facebook also allows users to
report account stealing incidents manually.
However, none of the above attempts can protect user
privacy when the attackers sneak in using the same devices
owned by the victims. Since the passwords, credentials, and
cookies are usually stored in users’ devices to avoid repeated
account authentication [5, 15, 22], attackers who have phys-
ical access to these devices can easily bypass all the above
detection schemes and obtain the sensitive information as-
sociated with the SNS accounts.
Continuous Authentication. Continuous authentica-
tion is an implicit, automatic re-authentication method that
analyzes the follow-up user actions after his/her initial au-
thentication to make sure if the user is still authentic. The
actions can be keyboard typing behavior [20], mouse move-
ments [19], operations on mobile devices [28], facial char-
acteristics (if a webcam is available) [17], or any other soft
biometric traits [18, 27].
However, the above analyses are per-person-based; that
is, a detection model is required for each user. This may
be cost-prohibitive on SNS servers given that an SNS site
usually have more than millions of users2. The continu-
ous authentication method proposed in this paper analyzes
web browsing behavior performed by only three predefined
user groups. The detection model is universal to all users
and it introduces low data collection and computation over-
head. Another advantage of our proposal is that the scheme
can be applied to a new account whose associated biomet-
ric behavior is not yet clear. Note that our proposal is
not a replacement for existing continuous authentication ap-
proaches. Rather, it can serve a low-cost filter for suspicious
accounts, with which the servers can trigger more sophisti-
cated, personalized analysis whenever necessary.
3. RATIONALE BEHIND OUR DETECTION
APPROACH
Nowadays, an SNS service such as Facebook is not merely
a place for people to maintain their friend lists. They are
more like a platform where people engage various social ac-
tivities, such as posting own status, reading others’ com-
ments on news, chatting, and meeting new people, etc. Stud-
ies [9, 13] show that there is no typical user behavioral pat-
tern on a complicated, open platform like Facebook, as every
single user seems to have his/her own behavioral tendency
on an SNS service. For example, some people tend to fulfill
their desire on self-presentation, so they spend most time on
sharing their own latest status and posting the latest pho-
tos/events. In the meantime, some people may manage to
engage new friends online; some chat with familiar friends;
some spend time discovering new social games; and some
others like to stalk certain other users.
2For example, Facebook has more than a billion monthly
active users as of December 2012.
Given the diversity in user behavioral patterns determined
by users’ personal characteristics and social status, it is hard
to profile every user’s browsing behavior when they are us-
ing an SNS service. However, we argue that users would
normally exhibit significantly different behavior when they
are browsing their own and others’ pages.
In the context of usage stealing, each user can have one
of the three following roles when using an SNS service: 1)
owner, when he/she is using his/her own account; 2) ac-
quaintance (as a stalker), when he/she is using the account
of someone he/she knows; and 3) stranger (as a stalker),
when he/she is using the account of an unknown person.
Intuitively, when checking the Facebook newsfeed as the
owner, a user would focus more on the latest information
of friends and use the “like” or “share” function to interact
with others. On the other hand, when browsing a news-
feed as a stalker (either an acquaintance or a stranger), the
user may be interested in earlier information that is more
interesting to the stalker. He/she may not interact with
others because he/she does not want the owner to discover
the stealthy usage later. In summary, we believe that users
would normally behave differently at different roles because
• The way people treat familiar information (or infor-
mation from familiar friends) would be different than
the way they treat unfamiliar information;
• People at different roles would have different inten-
tions;
• In order not to be found by the account owners, people
as the stalkers may behave differently with the time
pressure.
We call the above differences in users’ browsing behavior
as the role-driven behavioral diversity. We conjecture that
Facebook users, as well as users of the other SNS services,
possess such diversity, and this serves as the main rationale
behind our detection scheme.
In the following, we shall prove that the role-driven be-
havioral diversity indeed exists using the datasets we collect
in a user study on Facebook (Section 4) and then show that
our detection scheme can rely on this property to classify
account owners from stalkers (Section 5).
4. FACEBOOK USER BEHAVIOR
We use Facebook as a case study on users’ role-driven
behavior.
4.1 Data Collection
To capture the role-driven behavioral diversity, we hire
a number of Facebook users to be our subjects and design
experiments in which subjects browse Facebook newsfeed at
different roles. In other words, we ask each subject to browse
1) his/her own newsfeed, 2) his/her friend’s newsfeed, and
3) a stranger’s newsfeed.
To conduct the experiment, we hire pairs of subjects from
an one-million-user Internet community. Each pair of sub-
jects must be with at least one of the following relationships:
friends, family members, colleagues, classmates, and cou-
ples. Each subject is paid 10 USD and we get the subject’s
permission to record all actions (e.g., clicks, typing, page
views, etc.) he/she performs when browsing a newsfeed. A
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Account A
A B D
Account B
C A B
Account C
D C A
Account D
B D C
30 minutes 30 minutes 30 minutes
A
B
C
D
time
Figure 1: (A,B) and (C,D) are pairs of acquain-
tances. Each experiment comprises 3 rounds. In
each round, each subject is assigned to an account
randomly ; overall, each subject is guaranteed to
browse his/her own account, the account of acquain-
tance, and an account of stranger in the three rounds
with a randomized order.
Property Value
# experiments 28
Total time 9302 min
# subjects 112
# male subjects 56
# female subjects 44
# sessions 278
# self-usage 100
# acquaintance-usage 81
# stranger-usage 97
Avg. session length 30 min
Avg. action rate 3.0 action/min
Avg. page switching rate 0.7 page/min
Table 1: A summary of the experiments and raw
dataset.
subject is hired only if he/she is an active Facebook user—
the subject must have more than 50 friends and consistently
stay on Facebook longer than 4 hours per week.
Each experiment comprises 3 rounds. In each round, a
subject is asked to browse the newsfeed of an account (ei-
ther of his/her, his/her friend’s, or a stranger’s own) for 30
minutes. The subjects and accounts are paired randomly,
but each subject is guaranteed to play all the 3 roles in the 3
rounds, as shown in Figure 1. During each round, the users
can perform any action they like (e.g., uploading photos,
leaving comments, etc.), but not including sabotage activi-
ties (e.g., changing the account password). Actions to follow
external links (such as videos) are allowed, but the subjects
are asked not to stay with external content for longer than
1 minute each time.
In order to capture the subjects’ activities performed on
Facebook, we use Fiddler, a free Web debugging proxy, to
monitor all the HTTP/HTTPS GET/POST requests issued
Actions Interactive
Page-
Switching
Expand Comments
√
Likes
√
View Cards
√
View Likes
√
View Messages
√
View Photos
√
To Friend List Page
√ √
To Note Page
√ √
To Photo Page
√ √
To Wall Page
√ √
To Fan Page
√
To Feed Page
√
To Group Page
√
To Message Page
√
Add Comments
Delete Comments
Click Hyper-links
Expand Page
Table 2: 18 types of common user actions we col-
lected on Facebook.
Time stamp Action Target Person
1345837539249.47 Likes Friend A
1345837568519.15 View Cards Account Owner
1345837586398.26 Add Comment Friend A
1345837732512.73 Group page
1345837756445.03 Likes Friend B
1345837770260.55 View Cards Non-Friend C
1345837773293.04 View Message Friend A
1345837828598.01 Likes Non-Friend C
1345837875240.45 Expand Page
Table 3: An exemplary list of the collected actions.
by a browser. By parsing the HTTP/HTTPS request logs,
we are able to capture every action performed by a user (to
be explained later). Table 1 summarizes the experiments
and the raw dataset we collect. Note that, although we have
administrators overseeing the experiment process, some sub-
jects do not follow the contract to browse the given Face-
book newsfeeds. Out of 311 sessions, we remove 33 “noisy
sessions” of those subjects who are obviously not focusing on
the newsfeeds, i.e., sessions with any idle, non-active period
longer than 5 minutes.
We categorize the common user activities on Fcebook into
18 different actions, as shown in Table 2. Among these ac-
tions we can identify 2 groups: 1) interactive actions: those
by which the user interacts with a certain person; and 2)
page-switching actions: those lead the browser to switch to
another Facebook page. By parsing the HTTP/HTTPS re-
quest logs, we obtain a chronological action list for each
session, as exemplified in Table 3. Each record in the list
contains the action name, the occurrence time stamp, and,
if the action is interactive, the target person the user inter-
acts with. Based on the account owner’s profile and friend
list, we annotate the target person with either the “account
owner,” “friend,” or “non-friend.”
4.2 Defining Features
Next, we define a number of features and obtain their val-
ues for every session we collect so that the machine learning
algorithms can be applied. Even we have a perfect learning
algorithm, without features that encode information about
who is controlling a session, the algorithm will have no way
to distinguish the account owners from stalkers. How to de-
fine features that we need is a key issue in this work, and
is usually challenging because it requires insights, domain
knowledge, creativity, and even “black arts” [3].
We interview heavy users of Facebook about their regu-
lar usage patterns and the ways they discover and explore
interesting information. Based on the results, we define 139
features. All the features of a particular session can be ex-
tracted from the session’s action list (see Table 3). Our
features can be basically summarized as follows:
1. f.<action>: the frequency of a certain action (per
minute). The <action> can be any action defined in
Table 2. We also keep f.acts and f.acts.excluding.
page.expand, the frequencies of all actions and all ac-
tions except the “expand page3” action respectively.
The reason we capture the latter feature is that we
want to determine how much a user really does in ad-
dition to merely browsing pages.
2. f.<target_type>.<action>: the frequency of a cer-
tain action targeting a certain target user type. The
<action> is an interactive action in Table 2 and <target_type>
can be self (if the target person is the account owner),
friend (if the target person is a friend of the account
owner), or nonfriend (if the target person is not a
friend).
3. b.<xxx>: the binary version of all the above features;
i.e., b.<xxx>= 1 iff f.<xxx> is greater than 0. For
example, b.<action> denotes whether or not a certain
action occurs during the session.
4. f.act.<target_type>: the frequency of all interactive
actions performed on a certain target user type.
5. ts.page.<page_type>: the time the session user spends
on a certain page type. The <page_type> can be feed
(the account’s newsfeed), msg (the account’s message
box), self (pages, such as the wall/friend list/note/photos,
of the account owner), friend (pages of friends), nonfriend
(pages of non-friends), or public (fans or groups pages).
6. f.act.page.<page_type>: the frequency of all actions
performed on a certain page type. We also keep f.act.
expand.page.<page_type> and f.act.non.expand.page.
<page_type>, the frequencies of the “expand page” ac-
tion and all other actions performed on a certain page
type respectively.
7. n.act.person: the number of target people the user
interacts with during the session.
8. n.act.person.<statistics>: the statistics of the counts
of visits to different users’ pages during the session.
The <statistics> include mean, standard_deviation,
3In Facebook, some pages (e.g., newsfeeds, walls, etc.)
and page items (e.g., comments, notifications lists, etc.)
are expandable. For clarity, these pages/items show ear-
lier/detailed information only upon expansion.
median, and maximum. For example, suppose that the
user visits his/her own pages 1 time, friend A’s pages
3 times, friend B’s pages 1 time, and non-friend C’s
pages 2 times, then we obtain mean= 1.75, standard_
deviation= 0.96, median= 1.5, and maximum= 3. The
reason we capture these features is that we want to de-
termine whether a user pays attention to any specific
person.
After extracting the features for each session, we obtain a
dataset ready for analysis. Each session is labeled with ei-
ther “owner,” “acquaintance,” or “stranger,” depending on
the user’s role for the session in the experiment.
4.3 Role-Driven Behavioral Diversity
To justify the existence of the role-driven behavioral diver-
sity between the account owners, acquaintances, and strangers,
we carry out some analysis of the user behavior performed at
different roles. Our observations are summarized as follows.
General Diversity. As shown in Figure 2(a), all ses-
sions controlled by the three user roles have similar values in
f.acts. However, in f.acts.excluding.page.expand (Fig-
ure 2(b)), the sessions controlled by the account owners ex-
hibit higher values than those by the acquaintances, which
in term give higher values than those by strangers. This
implies that the acquaintances/strangers usually pay more
attention to reading/searching for interesting information.
They also care more about earlier information, as the con-
tent hidden by expandable pages/items by default are older.
The sessions used by acquaintances/strangers also yield
much lower values in f.act_add_comment (Figure 2(c)) and
f.act_like (Figure 2(d)) than those by the account owners.
The reason is obvious: Acquaintances/strangers normally do
not want to leave a clue of their peeping behavior.
What Stalkers Do Not Care. Although the acquain-
tances/strangers expand pages more frequently (Figure 2(b)),
they do not expand the comment lists as commonly as the
account owners do. This is because the acquaintances/strangers
may not know the people leaving the comments, therefore
showing less interest to them. Due to similar reasons, ac-
quaintances/strangers also express less interests in the fans/
groups pages (Figure 2(e)) and who likes a post (Figure
2(f)); in addition, they also spend less time in the accounts’
newsfeeds (Figure 2(g)). In particular, strangers tend to ig-
nore most of the newsfeeds because they generally do not
know people whose information appear in the feeds (Figure
2(h)).
What Acquainted Stalkers Care. As compared with
the other roles, the acquaintances pay more attention to the
accounts’ friend lists (Figure 2(i)). This is because an ac-
quaintance may know the account owner’s friends and be
curious about these friends’ status (especially the status of
those people who are not currently a friend of the acquain-
tance). The acquaintances are generally most interested in
the message boxes (Figure 2(j)) and the profile cards of the
accounts’ friends (Figure 2(k)) due to similar reasons.
What Stranger Stalkers Care. Interestingly, the ac-
count owners’ profiles (Figure 2(l)) and photos (Figure 2(m))
are most viewed by strangers rather than the account own-
ers’ friends or the owners themselves. This is because the
strangers do not know the account owners, so they are usu-
ally curious about who the owners are and how they look
like. The strangers are also less affected by the account own-
ers’ social relationship. For example, they are more willing
SNS ClientUser SNS Server Detection Model
 (4) Feed inn
(2) Collect actions for n minutes
(3) Extract features
 (6) If yes, challenge user.
 (1) Start session.
 (5) Suspicious?.
Figure 3: The flow chart of our detection scheme.
to check out non-friends (Figure 2(n)) and external links
(Figure 2(o)).
We believe that the above findings suffice to prove the
existence of the role-driven behavioral diversity. Next, we
show how this diversity can be further utilized to implement
a low-cost detector for usage stealing.
5. DETECTION SCHEME
This section introduces a scheme for detecting the usage
stealing on SNS sites.
In our dataset, each session is labeled with either “account
owner,” “acquaintance,” or “stranger.” Since our goal is to
distinguish stalkers from the account owners, in the follow-
ing, we replace the “acquaintance” and “stranger” labels with
a single “stalker” label.
Figure 3 gives an overview of our detection scheme. After
a user starts a session (by either logging-in newly or us-
ing existing authentication cookies, Step 1), the SNS server
monitors and collects a list of actions performed by the user
for an observation period of n minutes, where n is a con-
figurable parameter (Step 2). After the observation period,
the SNS server extracts the features of the monitored session
based on the recorded action list (Step 3), where the features
are defined in Section 4.2. It then feeds the session features
into a detection model (Step 4), which determines whether
the session owner is suspicious by predicting the label of the
session (Step 5). If the predicted label is “stalker,” the SNS
server can challenge the user by secret questions or via a
second channel such as mobile phone authentication (Step
6). Alternatively, the server can trigger a more sophisticated
(but costly) detection scheme.
Note that the scheme has low runtime cost on an SNS
server because it requires only one detection model for all
SNS users, taking the advantage of the role-driven behav-
ioral diversity. Also note that, although we employ a two-
class detection model to distinguish stalkers from the ac-
count owners, the scheme can be readily extended to iden-
tify the account owners, acquaintances, and strangers if a
multi-class detection model is adopted.
We obtain our detection model by training it using the
labeled sessions we collected. Clearly, the effectiveness of
our detection scheme largely depends on the quality of pre-
dictions made by the detection model. In order to obtain
high-quality predictions, we take rigorous steps in training
the model, as summarized below.
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Figure 2: The evidence of role-driven behavioral diversity.
5.1 Model Development
For ease of numeric operations, we treat the labels “stalker”
and “account owner” as 1 and −1 respectively. Given a train-
ing datasetD of size n,D = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn)},
where xi ∈ R
d is a labeled instance (i.e., session) with d fea-
tures and yi ∈ {1,−1} is the corresponding label, our goal
is to obtain a function f : Rd → R such that given a new
instance x′ with an unknown label y′, we have f(x′) > 0 iff
y′ = 1. The function f is the detection model in our scheme.
In Figure 3(4), the SNS server feeds the session x′ into f .
In Figure 3(5) the SNS server gets f(x′) and determines
whether the session is suspicious by sgn(f(x′)).
We obtain f based on the Support Vector Machine (SVM)
technique. The SVM is a very popular and promising ma-
chine learning algorithm for binary classification problems.
The idea is to let f be a linear function, i.e., f(x) = w⊤x+b
for some w ∈ Rd and b ∈ R, and then find w and b such that
the hyperplane {x : w⊤x+b = 0} separates the positive and
negative instances in D while leaving the largest “margin”
between {x : w⊤x + b = 1} and {x : w⊤x + b = −1},
i.e., w⊤xi + b ≥ 1 for all (xi, yi) ∈ D ∧ yi = 1 and
w
⊤
xi + b ≤ −1 for all (xi, yi) ∈ D ∧ yi = −1 (or equiva-
lently, yi(w
⊤
xi+b) ≥ 1 for all (xi, yi) ∈ D if we combine the
two inequations), as shown in Figure 4. Simple calculation
shows that the margin equals 2
‖w‖
2
. Therefore, to maximize
the margin, we can instead minimize ‖w‖
2
, which leads to
the objective below:
arg min
w,b,ξ
‖w‖2
2
s.t. yi(w
⊤
xi + b) ≥ 1 for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(1)
In practice, the training datasetD usually contains instances
that are noises or outliers (i.e., instances with wrong labels).
To tolerate these instances, the SVM does not insist the
positive and negative instances to be placed exactly at the
two sides of the margins. It introduces a slack variable ξi,
ξi ≥ 0, for each instance xi inD and requires only yi(w
⊤
xi+
b) ≥ 1− ξi. So noises and outliers can be placed inside the
margin or even at opposite sides. This gives the objective
of linear SVM:
arg min
w,b,ξ
‖w‖2
2
+C
n∑
i=1
ξi
s.t. yi(w
⊤
xi + b) ≥ 1− ξi and
ξi ≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
(2)
Note that the slacks are minimized as well (in the term∑n
i=1 ξi) in order to penalize the noises and outliers and
keep their numbers small. The hyperparameter C controls
the trade-off between maximizing the margin and minimiz-
ing the number of noises/outliers.
The linear SVM can be extended to nonlinear SVM by
utilizing the kernel trick. Define a function φ : Rd → Rd
′
,
d′ > d, that maps an instance x to a point in a higher (pos-
sibly infinite) dimensional space, the nonlinear SVM finds
a separating hyperplane in that space. Since d′ > d, the
found hyperplane may not be linear anymore in the origi-
nal d-dimensional input space. It can be shown that, if we
choose φ carefully such that the inner product φ(a)⊤φ(b)
can be represented by a kernel function K : Rd × Rd → R
(i.e., φ(a)⊤φ(b) = K(a,b)) for any a,b ∈ Rd, then we can
solve the objective of nonlinear SVM in a manner whose
Figure 4: The separating hyperplane and margin of
SVM.
complexity is independent of the higher dimension d′. This
is known as the kernel trick. The nonlinear SVM usually
makes better predictions than the linear SVM does when
the input dimension d is not very high.
Practical Considerations. The objective of conven-
tional SVM (either linear or nonlinear) can be solved by
standard quadratic programming software. However, when
applied to an SNS service like Facebook, the solver needs to
deal with an extremely large D due to the huge user base
owned by the SNS service. To speed up the training pro-
cess, we adopt the Smooth SVM (SSVM) [14] in this paper.
The SSVM, a variant of SVM, adds b
2
2
into the objective of
SVM and employs the squares of slacks ξ2i to penalize the
noises/outliers. The SSVM utilizes the KKT optimization
condition to convert the conventional SVM to an uncon-
strained minimization problem that can be solved efficiently
using the Newton’s method with an Armijo stepsize.
The kernel trick applies to the SSVM too. In our experi-
ment, we pair up the nonlinear SSVM with the RBF kernel,
which is defined as K(a,b) = e−γ‖a−b‖
2
2 .
There are 2 hyperparameters we have to determine in the
nonlinear SSVM: the penalty coefficient C and γ in the RBF
kernel function. We use the uniform design model selection
method [12] with 9-13 stages to search for an appropriate
combination of these hyperparameters.
5.2 Feature Selection
The training of SSVM is preceded by a feature selection
process [25], where we select only a subset of features in
D for the training. This process is necessary because 1)
given a tremendous amount of sessions (Figure 3(1)) that
will be monitored by the SNS servers, it helps the SSVM
scale up in making predictions by considering only a small
set of features; 2) the selected features give us a hint on
what is useful to distinguish the stalkers from the account
owners. By ignoring those features that are not helpful, we
can collect fewer actions (Figure 3(2)) and save the cost of
feature extraction (Figure 3(3)) on each SNS server; and 3)
our results show that it improves the prediction accuracy of
the final SSVM we obtain.
The feature selection precess is divided into two stages, as
shown in Figure 5. In the first stage, we use the 1-norm SVM
Feature Extraction
Candidate Features Set Selection
(1-norm SVM)
Detection Model
(SSVM)
 Forward Feature Selection
Figure 5: The steps in training a detection model.
[31] to determine a candidate set of features. In the second
stage, we use the forward feature selection [25] algorithm to
determine the best final features from the candidate set for
training the detection model.
Unlike the SVM which minimizes ‖w‖2
2
in its objective
(Eq. (2)), the 1-norm SVM minimizes ‖w‖2
1
(called the
LASSO penalty [23]) instead. We employ the 1-norm SVM
to determine the candidate set because it usually finds a
sparse w (i.e., w that tends to have zeros) thanks to its
“compressed sensing” interpretation [8]. We obtain the can-
didate set by keeping only those features that correspond to
the non-zeros in w, as the features corresponding to zeros
are usually redundant or noise features [31].
And then, we use the forward feature selection algorithm
to determine the final features from the candidate set. The
algorithm starts with an empty set for keeping the final fea-
tures. At each step, one feature from the candidate set that
improves the prediction accuracy4 of SSVM most is added
to this set. The algorithm then repeats the above step until
the candidate set becomes empty or there is no feature in
the candidate set that improves the accuracy.
6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed detection model.
6.1 Settings and Metrics
After data cleaning (described in Section 4.1), there are
278 instances (i.e., sessions) in D, among which 178 in-
stances are positive (i.e., labeled by +1, which denotes “ac-
quaintance” or “stranger”) and 100 instances are negative
(i.e., labeled by −1, which denotes “account owner”). Each
instance is presented by 139 feature values.
To the best of our knowledge, currently there is no other
detection scheme for the usage stealing problem in SNS ser-
vices. Thus we compare the detection model to itself by
imposing different observation periods. Specifically, given
an observation period L, we extract the feature values of a
session only from those actions that are performed within
L minutes after the start of the session. We study the
performance of the detection model given L = 1, 2, · · · , 25
minutes. Although a subject was asked browse an SNS ac-
count for 30 minutes during each round of the experiment
described in Section 4.1, we set the maximal value of L to
25 rather than 30 because some subjects appear to lose pa-
tience and become idle after 25 minutes. Under the premise
of data consistency, we consider L ≤ 25 here.
As described in Sections 5.2 and Section 5.1, to obtain our
detection model, we first employ the 1-norm SVM to get the
candidate features, and then use the forward feature selec-
tion and SSVM with 10-fold cross validation to find the best
4We use the 10-fold cross validation [25] to measure the
accuracy.
Predicted
Pos. Neg.
Real
Pos. #True Positives (TP) #False Negatives (FN)
Neg. #False Positives (FP) #True Negatives (TN)
Table 4: The confusion matrix.
With Oversampling Without Oversampling
With Acc: 93.53% Acc: 90.29%
Feature FPR: 5.00% FPR: 18.00%
Selection FNR: 7.30% FNR: 5.06%
F -score 0.9483 0.9260
Without Acc: 91.37% Acc: 87.77%
Feature FPR: 6.00% FPR: 22.00%
Selection FNR: 10.11% FNR: 6.74%
F -score 0.9302 0.9071
Table 5: The results achieved under various condi-
tions.
final features and best combination of the hyperparameters
C and γ. We report the performance of our model by using
the leave-one-out cross validation [25] on D5.
To measure the performance, we first obtain a confusion
table shown in Table 4 by counting the numbers of True
Positives (TP), False Positives (FP), True Negatives (TN),
and False Negatives (FN) made by the model when predict-
ing the labels of instances in the testing dataset. And then
we calculate the following metrics:
Accuracy = TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
,
FPR = FP
TN+FP
,
FNR = FN
TP+FN
,
TPR = TP
TP+FN
,
P recision = TP
TP+FP
,
Recall = TP
TP+FN
,
F -score = 2 ∗ Precision∗Recall
Precision+Recall
,
with various observation periods.
6.2 Detection Performance at 25 Minutes
We first study the performance of our detection model
when L = 25 minutes. Table 5 shows the results achieved
by the model with and without feature selection. As we can
see, feature selection does improve the performance by giv-
ing higher accuracy/F -scores and lower FPR/FNR. This is
because the noisy features are successfully eliminated. Fig-
ure 6 shows that there are only 60 features remain after the
applying the 1-norm SVM for candidate set selection.
We notice that the dataset D is imbalanced—the ratio of
positive instances to negative ones is 1.78 : 1. Since there
are more positive than negative instances, we tend to obtain
a higher FPR. To overcome this issue, we adopt an over-
sampling approach by randomly selecting and duplicating
78 negative instances to balance the ratio between positive
and negative instances. The effect of duplicating an instance
is to double the penalty if we misclassify the instance. So
5We do not partition D into the training, validation, and
testing sets because D is not large enough.
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Figure 6: The weights in w found by the 1-norm
SVM over the corresponding features. The features
are ranked by their weights. Only 60 features re-
main in the candidate feature set.
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Figure 7: The ROC curve and AUC given by the
model at 25-minutes.
by duplicating negative instances in D we can avoid aliasing
and reduce the FPR. Note that because there exists random-
ness when applying the oversampling technique, we train 10
models and average their results. Table 5 shows the re-
sults achieved by our model with and without oversampling.
We can see that the oversampling successfully controls the
trade-off between FPR and FNR.
Figure 7 shows the ROC curve and AUC of our model
when both the feature selection and oversampling are ap-
plied. We get a fairly high AUC (0.962). In particular, the
ROC curve shows that we can achieve 90% TPR at 4.5%
FPR.
6.3 Early Detection Performance
To prevent the leak of sensitive information, we should
perform the usage stealing detection as early as possible for
each session. To see how our model performs with time
limits, we vary L from 1 to 25 minutes and train respective
models for each L with feature selection and oversampling.
Figure 8 shows the accuracy achieved by these models. After
7 minutes, we can get stable and reasonably good results,
with the accuracy rate higher than 90% with L ≥ 7 minutes.
Even at 2 minutes, we obtain an accuracy above 80%, which
is still satisfactory when the scheme is used as a trigger for
more sophisticated analysis.
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Figure 8: Accuracy for every minute. It shows that
our detection model can achieve stable and reason-
ably good results after 7 minutes.
0 5 10 15 20 25
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
Observation period (minutes)
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Figure 9: The accuracy achieved by 20 models
trained using the 10-fold cross validation on 20 ran-
domly permuted datasets. The thick line represents
the average accuracy.
To test the robustness of our model, we randomly per-
mute D for 20 times and train one model using the 10-fold
cross validation [25] for each of the 20 permutations. Fig-
ure 9 and Table 6 show the mean accuracy and standard
deviation given by the 20 models. The results indicate that
the accuracy has a very low standard deviation regardless
of L. In addition, comparing Figure 9 with Figure 8, we
can see that our model performs consistently no matter it is
trained (using the 10-fold cross validation) or tested (using
the leave-one-out cross validation), which means the perfor-
mance of our detection scheme is very robust.
7. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As shown in Figure 3, all the data collection, processing,
decision, and follow-up actions (such as challenges and pun-
ishment) in our scheme can all be performed on the server
side. So there is no way for attackers to compromise the
scheme from the clients.
Since our detection methodology is running at the server
side (i.e., at operators), the attackers cannot evade our de-
tection scheme—once logged-in, each user (including the at-
tacker) must be monitored by an SNS server running our
scheme. The only way for an attacker to continuously use
Minute 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mean 81.9% 83.2% 85.3% 87.5% 88.8% 89.2%
Std. 0.7% 0.8% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8% 0.5%
8 9 10 11 12 13
Mean 91.3% 92.9% 92.2% 91.5% 91.0% 92.0%
Std. 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4%
14 15 16 17 18 19
Mean 90.8% 92.7% 93.6% 92.6% 92.0% 92.0%
Std. 0.5% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6%
20 21 22 23 24 25
Mean 92.5% 93.3% 93.3% 92.1% 93.5% 92.6%
Std. 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8%
Table 6: Mean and standard deviation of the accu-
racy given by the models trained using the 10-fold
cross validation on 20 randomly permuted datasets.
the victim’s account is to evade the detection model.
The detection model does not rely on any cryptography
technology and is completely user-behavior-based. So, in
order not to be detected by the model, attackers have to 1)
mimic the owners’ actions; or 2) do as few actions as possible
and run away. The attackers of the first kind are less likely
because the owner’s action model is not well known [13].
Even if some attackers read this paper and successfully mimic
the owners, they are forced to spend time on something they
are not really interested and skip some information they de-
sire more. This makes the attacks less harmful. For the at-
tackers of the second kind, our scheme imposes a high time
pressure because the detection model can achieve close to
80% accuracy even if an attackers browse the victims’ news-
feeds for only 1 minute. Again, the time pressure makes
the attacks less harmful because the attackers may not be
able to find the information they want within such a limited
time.
Note that our detection scheme is not tied to any spe-
cific detection model. For example, a personalized detection
model can be particularly helpful to identify the attackers
of the first kind because it is even harder to imitate each
individual’s behavior. Also, a detection model that takes
the timestamp of each action into account may be helpful
to identify the attackers of the second kind, because users
(either the account owners or stalkers) often take actions in
some order they are used to. In fact, while this work firstly
points out a new direction for future research against the us-
age stealing, it is certainly possible to develop more sophis-
ticated detection models to fight against the ever-smarter
attackers.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel continuous au-
thentication approach for SNS that analyzes users’ browsing
behavior to detect usage stealing incidents. We use Face-
book as a case study and show that 1) the role-driven be-
havioral diversity does exist; 2) based on the so-called role-
driven behavioral diversity property, we can design a low-
cost detection scheme applicable to all users; and 3) the
scheme is hard to evade and it renders reasonable detection
performance after an observation period of 2 minutes.
As future work, we plan to study the browsing behavior
of individuals and develop personalized detection models.
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Figure 10: Top-3 features used to identify the posi-
tive instances (stalkers) in the first 7 minutes.
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Figure 11: Top-3 features used to ientify the nega-
tive instances (owners) in the first 7 minutes.
These models can be triggered only when needed and serve
as the detailed analyzers for suspicious sessions. We also
plan to improve our low-cost detection model to give higher
detection accuracy within the first 7 minutes. Such an im-
provement is possible because we see different user behav-
ior in short- and long-term. To share our observation, we
count features corresponding to the 3 most positive and 3
most negative weights in w identified by SSVM when the
observation period L varies from 1 to 7. Figures 10 and 11
show the histograms of counts of the 3 most positively- and
negatively-weighted features respectively. Some features are
rather surprising as they are not prominent in the full 30-
minute traces discussed in Section 4.3. We hope this study
can motivate in-depth studies on developing more sophisti-
cated models against usage stealing issues.
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